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NOTES AND COMMENTS
pensation is generally denied if the instructions limited the sphere of the
employment, but compensation is generally awarded if the instructions
merely directed the employees not to do certain acts, or not to do an
act within the sphere of the employment in a certain way.20 If the
violation does not take the employee out of the sphere of the employ-
ment, he is only guilty of negligence and is not deprived of the pro-
tection of the workmen's compensation acts.21  In addition, where the
act is necessitated by an emergency,22 or the instructions against com-
mitting the acts is habitually violated,23 the employee's case is greatly
strengthened.
It is submitted that if there is authority, express or implied, to do
acts in furtherance of the employer's good will, such acts should not
be held to be a deviation from the course of the employment to the
extent that compensation will not be granted. Of course, the courts
will have to examine the facts and circumstances of each case and
apply a reasonable rule, such as, whether the acts could be reasonably
held within the scope of an employer's policy to create good will. The
courts might go further and base the award on whether the act did
create, or was aimed at creating, good will for the employer; but what-
ever the theory or basis used, good will should be given careful con-
sideration by the courts when applicable to a particular fact situation.
CALVIN B. BRYANT.
Criminal Law-Attempted Perjury-the Rules of "Legal" and
"Factual" Impossibility as Applied to the Law of
Criminal Attempts
In a recent decision, State v. Latiolais,l the Supreme Court of Loui-
siana upheld a conviction of attempted prejury. So far as is known, this
is the first reported conviction of such a crime in the history of law.2
" Maryland Casualty Co. v. Brown, 131 Tex. 404, 115 S. W. 2d 394 (1938);
Prentice v. Twin City Wholesale Grocery, 202 Minn. 455, 278 N. W. 895 (1938);
Moss v. Hamilton, 234 Ala. 181, 174 So. 622 (1937).21 See note 20 supra.
"2 O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, 340 U. S. 504 (1951). Defendant main-
tained a recreation area for employees. It was forbidden, and signs were erected
to that effect, to swim in the channel because of the dangerous currents. The
plaintiff's intestate swam in the channel in an attempt to rescue an unknown man
and was downed. Compensation was granted.
"2 Archie v. Greene Bros. Lumber Co., 222 N. C. 477, 23 S. E. 2d 834 (1934):
Moss v. Hamilton, 234 Ala. 181, 174 So. 622 (1937).
1225 La. 878, 74 So. 2d 148 (1954).
2 Generally, when courts have been unable to convict a defendant of perjury, the
defendant has been acquitted. Where, for example, the officer administering the
oath did not have authority to administer it, courts have held that a demurrer to
the indictment should be sustained. United States v. Curtis, i07 U. S. 671 (1883) ;
United States v. Garcelon, 82 Fed. 611 (D. Colo. 1897) ; United States v. Edwards,
43 Fed. 67 (C. C. S. D. Ala. 1890) ; State v. Phippen, 62 Iowa 54, 17 N. W. 146
(1883).
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The verdict in the lower court was returned on an indictment for
perjury.3 The opinion of the court did not relate the facts of the case,
but stated that there could be attempted perjury, for example, where
"the board or official for some reason was not legally authorized to take
testimony, or if the one administering the oath was not authorized or
qualified to administer it."
'4
The questions raised by the case are (1) whether the elements of
criminal attempts are applicable to the crime of perjury, and (2) if so,
whether the so-called "rules" relating to "impossibility," applied in many
attempt situations, are relevant to attempted perjury. Each of these will
be discussed.
Criminal attempt is defined as an act done with intent to commit a
crime, tending but failing to effect its commission.5 Thus, the elements
of attempt are: (1) specific intent to commit the particular crime at-
tempted; (2) some overt act directed toward accomplishment of the
crime; and (3) failure of consummation of the crime intended.0
The intent. There must be specific intent to commit the particular
3 Such procedure is permitted in Louisiana by the following statute: "When the
crime charged includes another of lesser grade, a verdict of guilty of the lesser
crime is responsive to the indictment, and it is of no moment that the greater of-
fense is a felony and the lesser a misdemeanor." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:406
(1951).
The following states have a similar statute: Alabama, Arizona, California, Con-
necticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wis-
consin.
For the federal statute on this procedure, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 (c).
It would seem, theoretically at least, that states having this statute and the
federal courts would permit the return of a verdict of guilty of attempted perjury
on a charge for perjury. Much would depend, however, on the substantive law of
each jurisdiction.
' State v. Latiolais, 225 La. 878, 74 So. 2d 148, 150 (1954). The court actually
held that the verdict of guilty of attempted perjury was responsive to the indictment
for perjury.
IN. Y. PEN. LAW § 2. The Louisiana statutory definition is: "Any person who,
having a specific intent to commit a crime, does or omits an act for the purpose of
and tending directly toward the accomplishing of his object is guilty of an attempt
to commit the offense intended; and it shall be immaterial whether, under the cir-
cumstances, he would have actually accomplished his purpose." LA. Ray. STAT.
ANN. § 14:27 (1951).
The following states have varying statutory definitions of attempt: Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. All states have general
penal statutes for attempt, except: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas. Although these states do not have
general penal statutes encompassing all attempted crimes, most of them have
statutes punishing specific attempts, such as attempted arson, rape, robbery, etc.
' Graham v. People, 181 Ill. 477, 55 N. E. 179 (1899); Scott v. People, 141 Ill.
195, 30 N. E. 329 (1892); Thompson v. People, 96 Ill. 158 (1880); Johnson v.
State, 27 Neb. 687, 43 N. W. 425 (1889) ; State v. Thompson, 31 Nev. 209, 101 Pac.
557 (1909) ; Hicks v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 223, 9 S. E. 1024 (1889).
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crime attempted, 7 or as stated by one writer, there must be intent to
commit a specific crime." The requisite mens rea is "the state of mind
of the man who intends the consequences of his conduct."9  In attempt
situations, special emphasis is placed on the element of intent.
These generalizations may be more meaningful if we consider the'
function of the mental element in criminal attempts. It is to identify
those who consciously engage in a criminal endeavor and to distinguish
those who act negligently' ° and blunderingly:" from those who will or
desire specific consequences which the criminal law proscribes.
Applying this to attempted perjury, it would appear that a defendant,
to be convicted in Louisiana and most other states,12 would have to make
'Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380 (1860) ; Dahlberg v. People, 225 Ili. 485, 80 N. E.
310 (1907); State v. Meadows, 18 W. Va. 658 (1881); MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 29a (1934) ; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 215 (11th ed. 1912) ; Sayre, Criminal
Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 837-842 (1928); Turner, Attempts to Commit
Crimes, 5 CAmB. L. J. 230, 235 (1934).
' Keedy, Criminal Attempts at Common Law, U. OF PA. L. REv. 464, 468 (1954).
' Turner, supra note 7, at 235.
10 Obviously there can be no attempt at negligence, since a negligent act is by
definition done without intent. Moore v. State, 18 Ala. 532, 534 (1851) ; Scott v.
State, 49 Ark. 156, 4 S. W. 750 (1886). See also Simpson v. State, 59 Ala. 1
(1879) ; Morgan v. State, 33 Ala. 413, 414 (1859) ; White v. State, 13 Tex. App.
259, 261 (1882) ; MILLER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 29a; Sayre, supra note 7, at 842.
" Definition also precludes blundering into an attempt. Sayre, supra note 7, at
842.
12 The Louisiana statutory definition of perjury is as follows: "Perjury is the
intentional making of a false statement in, or for use in, a judicial proceeding, or
any proceeding before a board or official, wherein such board or official is authorized
to take testimony. In order to constitute perjury the false statement must be made
under sanction of an oath or an equivalent affirmation and must relate to matter
material to the issue or question in controversy." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:123
(1951).
It should be noted that the Louisiana statutory definition of perjury has in-
corporated the common law offenses of perjury and false swearing. At common
law, false swearing in only judicial proceedings was punished as perjury. CLARK
AND MARSHALL, CRIMES § 446 (5th ed. 1952) ; 2 WHARTON, Op. cit. supra note 7,
§ 1058. All other false swearing under oaths required by law was punished under
the offense designated "false swearing." Regina v. Hodgkiss, 11 Cox C. C. 365
(1869); Regina v. Chapman, 175 Eng. Rep. 356 (1850); 2 WHARTON, sUpra.
Most states have statutes similar to the Louisiana statute: ARIZ. CODE ANN.
§43-4201 (1939); ARK. STAT. §§ 41-3001 and 41-3002 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE
§§ 118 and 118a (Supp. 1953) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8481 (1949) ; IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-5401 (1948) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 473 (1935) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3801
(1942) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 721.1 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. § 21-701 (1949) ; Ky.
REV. STAT. § 432.170 (1953) (this statute does not call the offense "perjury," but
is similar to the general perjury statutes) ; ME. REv. STAT. c. 135, § 1 (1954) ; MD.
ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 27, § 531 (1951) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 268, §§ 1 and
IA (Supp. 1954) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 613.39 (1947) ; Miss. CODE Am. § 2315
(1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.010 (1953); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-3801
(1947); NED. Rrv. STAT. § 29-2025 (1943); NEV. Co Ip. LAWS § 9974 (1929);
N. H. REV. LAWS c. 457, § 1 (1942) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-209 (1953) ; N. D.
REv. CODE § 12-1401 (1943): OHIO REv. CODE § 2917.25 (1954) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 491 (1937); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (1945) ; R. I. GEN. LAwS
c. 605, § 1 (1938); S. D. CODE § 13.1237 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 11073
(Williams 1934); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-45-1, 76-45-7, 76-45-8 (1953); VA.
CODE § 18-237 (1950); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 9.72.010 and 9.72.030 (1953); WIs.
CRIM. CODE § 346.31 (1953).
However, a few states have preserved the common law distinction between the
1955]
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a false statement under an oath required by law, in the belief that the
person administering the oath was qualified and authorized, and in the
belief that the official, board, or judicial proceeding was authorized to
receive his testimony (whether written or oral).13 Quaere, whether the
defendant would also have to possess the belief that his false statement
would be "material," in those jurisdictions where materiality is an ele-
ment of the substantive crime of perjury.
The overt act. Intent alone, however clear, is of course never enough
to constitute an attempt. There must be some overt act directed toward
the accomplishment of the crime, by means "apparently suitable" to
accomplishment, and this overt activity must be designed to achieve the
anticipated results and must go beyond that stage which the courts am-
biguously refer to as "mere preparation.'
14
offenses of perjury and false swearing: DEL. CODE ANNr. tit. 11, §§ 721 and 722
(1953); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-4001-4003 (1953); N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-157-1 and
2-157-4 (1939) ; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 162.110 and 162.140 (1953) (the latter statute
defines false swearing as a false statement not material to the issue in question;
otherwise, false statements are perjury); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5999 and 6000
(1949).
The remaining states, though they have not merged into one the general statutes
on perjury and false swearing, define false swearing as perjury: CoLo. REv. STAT.
§§ 40-7-1 and 40-7-2 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 837.02 and 837.01 (1944) ; MIcH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 28.664 and 28.665 (1954); N. H. REv. LAWS c. 457, §§ 1 and 2
(1942); N. Y. PEN. LAW §§ 1620 and 1622; S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-201 and 16-203
(1952); VT. REv. STAT. §§ 8515 and 8516 (1947).
The general federal statute on perjury is. 18 U. S. C. § 1621 (1952).
1 For example, see the federal statute, and the statutes in New Jersey, Oregon,
and West Virginia. Supra note 12. In the Louisiana statute, supra note 12,
materiality is made an element of the crime of perjury, but the court in State v.
Latiolais did not discuss what effect, if any, this might have on the requisite nature
of the defendant's intent
This problem would not arise in Arkansas, New York, Utah, and Washington
where the offense of perjury has been divided into two degrees. The main distinc-
tion between the two classifications is that first degree perjury applies to false
swearing as to material matter, and second degree, to immaterial matter. Supra
note 12.
" CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMI ES § 118 (5th ed. 1952) ; HALL, GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 99-117 (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., (1947);
MILLER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 29f; 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 7, § 219.
If the means appear to the defendant sufficient to consummate the crime, the
weight of authority is that there is an attempt. Beale, Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV.
L. REv. 491, 496-500 (1903). Thus, where the defendant points a gun and pulls the
trigger, it is an attempt to kill, even though the gun did not go off, People v. Ryan,
55 Hun, 214, 8 N. Y. Supp. 41 (1889), or even though the gun did not have a cap
on it, Mullen v. State, 45 Ala. 43 (1871). And it has been held an attempt to kilt
where one administers a harmless drug to another, thinking it poisonous. State v.
Glover, 27 S. C. 602, 4 S. E. 564 (1888). Likewise, placing an insufficient dose of
poison into another's cup with intent to kill has been held an attempt. Common-
wealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770 (1897).
The problem of distinguishing between "mere preparation" and attempt is some-
times difficult, though some of the cases provide rather clear examples. For in-
stance, generally it is held that purchasing or owning some article with which to
commit a crime is not an indictable attempt. Purchasing poison would not be
indictable as as attempt to poison, but intentionally placing it in the way of other
human beings would be. Mullen v. State, 45 Ala. 43 (1871). Owning a false
weight would not be an attempt to cheat, but using it as a means of cheating would
[Vol. 33
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The function of the overt act "element" is similar to that of the intent
"element." The rationale of attempts assumes that certain acts, which
tend but fail to effect the commission of a crime intended to be consum-
mated, ought to be punished. 15 Functionally, then, the act should (1)
supply evidence to preclude punishment of mere mental activity; (2)
supply evidence that the defendant intended the commission of a specific
crime; and (3) supply evidence of some external harm to society'6
(this external harm may be recognizable from the harm inherent in the
nature of the overt act itself, or it may be recognizable from the immi-
nent threat of the harm that would result if the substantive crime were
committed) .17
be such an attempt. Regina v. Brown, 48 L. T. 270 (1882). If a man, with intent
to rape a child, went to the place where the child was located, though that would
be some act toward commission of the crime, it would not be indictable. Regina v.
Meredith, 173 Eng. Rep. 630 (1838). Holmes has said that "the act must come
pretty near to accomplishing that result [intended]." Commonwealth v. Kennedy,
170 Mass. 18, 20, 48 N. E. 470 (1897). And Baron Parke has stated that criminal
attempt originates when the actor no longer controls the force which he has set
in motion, Regina v. Eagleton, 169 Eng. Rep. 826, 836 (1855), though that would
not seem applicable when considering, for example, attempted rape.
So as not to oversimplify the problem of distinguishing between "mere prepa-
ration" and attempt, the following will illustrate some of the difficulties: "The
defendant bought matches to set a. fire; he cannot yet be punished. He solicited
another to burn and furnished him with material; there is no punishable attempt.
He prepared combustibles at the house, went to a third party, solicited him to set
the fire, and started with him toward the house. Quaere-whether a punishable
attempt has been committed. The combustibles were arranged and another who
was on the spot was solicited to light it; the attempt is punishable. The defendant
himself having arranged the combustibles lit a match, which went out, or lit a candle
and placed it among the combustibles, or lit the combustibles, he has committed a
crime." Beale, Criminal Attemps, 16 HAv. L. REv. 491, 504-505 (1903).
It is hoped that the ideas developed in this note will be of some assistance in
approaching the problem of "preparation."
HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 99 and 129.
l External harm to society may be said to result from the impairment of some
legally protectible interest or from a threat of such impairment. Some of these
interests are life, limb, privacy, property, public peace, health, morals, welfare, and
the like. As applied to perjury, some protectible interests are: effective and effi-
cient functioning of governmental agenices, orderly conduct of legal proceedings,
solemnity of the oath, dignity and respect of the court, essential powers of legal
agencies for administration of justice, etc.
What constitutes external harm to society will vary with social mores and
attitudes and how both are reflected and ingrained into the minds of individuals
attempting to determine the external harm. Social mores and attitudes are naturally
affected by philosophical, sociological, theological, psychological, political, and eco-
nomic influences.
External harm is not absolute, but relative to a given society. This is evidenced
by the fact that at very early common law attempts to commit crimes were not
punished though today they are.
On the subject of external harm, see HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 15, 61, 96-
97, 111, 113, 115-116, 135-136.
"? It is important to realize that there may be harm inherent in the overt act
itself as well as in the threat of the harm of the substantive crime. For example,
in attempted perjury, it may be harmful to society for a person to exhibit a con-
tempt for legal proceedings, even under circumstances where his false swearing
cannot amount to perjury. It may very well be that the threat of perjury may add
to that harm but there is nevertheless harm in the unsuccessful act itself. The same
is true of attempted rape, where there is harm both in the unsuccessful acts as well
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Functional rather than conceptual application of the elements of at-
tempt may be a more edifying method of determining criminality in spe-
cific cases involving alleged attempts. This is true, for example, when
considering attempted perjury, where the court should be less concerned
with how "dangerously close" the act comes to consummation of the in-
tended crime, and more primarily concerned with the external harm
inherent in the defendant's acts, that is, his wilful affront to the solemnity
of the oath and to the dignity of a governmental agency.18
Accordingly, intentional lying under oath before an official appar-
ently authorized to administer the oath should be a sufficient overt
act. Quaere, whether the following would be sufficient: making an
immaterial false statement (in jurisdictions requiring the statement to
be material for the crime of perjury) ; making a false statement on the
witness stand which is interrupted before completion; falsifying an affi-
davit which is never used for the purpose intended; falsifying a written
statement which is changed before an oath is taken.
Failure of consummation of the crime intended. Obviously, the overt
act must fail to effect the crime, else the law would concern itself with
punishing the substantive crime. 19 As reference to particular cases indi-
cates, many circumstances may operate to prevent successful completion.
Some may cause interruption of the overt act,20 preventing the defendant
as in the threat of rape. In some cases of attempted rape, the threat may not in
actuality be so important, for example where the offender is impotent.
The extent of the harm in attempts will always be affected by the gravity of the
substantive crime, but it is impprtant to recognize that that will not necessarily be
exclusive of the extent of the harm.
See note 52 infra.
8 However, in a case of attempted arson, where the defendant's match is blown
out before the combustibles are lit, a court could concern itself equally with the
problems of proximity (how "dangerously close") and external harm.
The proximity test is often applied by the courts in attempt cases. For a dis-
cussion of this aspect of attempts, see Beale, Criminal Attempts, 16 HARV. L. REv.
491, 501-506 (1903).
" However, the language of this Louisiana statute would seem to be contra:
"An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the intended crime and any person
may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime although it appears on the trial
that the crime intended or attempted was actually perpetrated by such person in
pursuance of such attempt." LA. REv. STAT. A~x. § 14:27 (1951).
Most states do not permit conviction of an attempt when the substantive crime
has been consummated. However, several states have statutes similar to the one in
Louisiana.
"0 These circumstances involve the over-all question of how far one must go in
preparation before being guilty of an attempt. If one preparing to commit arson
strikes a match to combustibles, but the match goes out, the person will still be
guilty of an attempt. Regina v. Taylor, 175 Eng. Rep. 831 (1859). And where the
defendant starts from his house with a dynamite bomb to blow up a railroad track,
but is arrested some distance from the track, it has been held that he is guilty of
an attempt. People v. Stites, 75 Cal. 570, 17 Pac. 693 (1888). Attempt has also
been found where the defendant threw oil on a house with intent to burn it. but was
frightened away before igniting the oil. Weaver v. State, 116 Ga. 550, 42 S. E. 745
(1902). "So far as the defendant's criminality is concerned, it would seem to make
little or no difference whether the interruption of the defendant's intended acts is
due to another's interference or to his own repentance or change of mind.... The
[Vol. 33
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from doing what he sought to do, and others may fender completion of
the crime impossible, even where the defendant does all he planned to
do.21 These latter circumstances have been labeled as "legal im-
possibility," "factual impossibility," "intrinsic impossibility," "extrinsic
impossibility," "absolute impossibility," and "relative impossibility.
'22
Impossibility to commit the crime of perjury may be evidenced where
an unauthorized official administers the oath; where a board, investiga-
tive committee, judicial proceeding, or any other legal proceeding is
unauthorized to receive testimony, or is illegally constituted; where a
legal proceeding does not have jurisdiction over the person testifying;
where an affidavit given is mistakenly believed to be required by law;
and the like.
From this discussion of the elements of criminal attempt, it is evident
that they can be made applicable to the crime of perjury.
What is primarily involved in State v. Latiolais is the "impossibility"
aspect of the case. In the examples cited by the court, where the board
or official was not legally authorized to take testimony, or where the one
administering the oath was not authorized or qualified to administer the
oath, it is impossible under all of the circumstances for the defendant to
commit the substantive crime of perjury. The problem therefore is the
relevancy of the general "rules" relating to "impossibility" in criminal
attempts to these particular circumstances.
Courts and writers generally recognize two kinds of "impossibility,".
"legal" and "factual."
23
It is said to be a general "rule" that a defendant cannot be guilty of
an attempt where it was "legally impossible" for him to commit the
burglar who, while trying to force the lock on the front door, decides to abandon
the attempt is equally guilty whether his change of mind is due to the voice of his
own conscience or the voice of an approaching policeman." Sayre, supra note 7, at
847.
2" Some cases in which the defendant has been held guilty under these circum-
stances are where the defendant attempts to pick an empty pocket, People v. Moran,
123 N. Y. 254, 25 N. E. 412 (1890), Regina v. Ring, 17 Cox C. C. 491, 66 L. T.
300 (1892), Regina v. Brown, 16 Cox C. C. 715, 61 L. T. 594 (1889) ; attempts an
abortion on a woman who is not -pregnant, Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 25 So. 144
(1898), State v. Snyder, 188 Iowa 1150, 177 N. W. 77 (1920), State v. Fitzgerald,
49 Iowa 260 (1878), Commonwealth v. Tibbets, 157 Mass. 519, 32 N. E. 910 (1893),
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261 (1882) ; attempts to shoot one who is not
in the place where the bullet is shot, People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 30 Pac.
800 (1892), State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 71 S. W. 175 (1902) ; attempts to poison
when the intended victim does not actually consume the poison, Commonwealth v.
Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770 (1897).
Cases in which the defendant has not been held guilty in "impossibility" circum-
stances are discussed in the text under "legal impossibility."
.2 See Keedy, supra note 8, at 476-489; Strayhorn, The Effect of Impossibility
on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 962 (1930) ; Turner, stpra note 7, at
246.
22 Other classifications, mentioned in the text elsewhere, are simply variations of
"legal" and "factual" impossibility.
1955]
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intended crime.24  In People v. Jaffe,25 it was held that the defendant
could not be guilty of an attempt to receive stolen goods because the
goods were not actually stolen. In Marley v. State,26 it was held that
the defendants, members of a county board of freeholders, could not be
guilty of an attempt to incur indebtedness on behalf of the county in an
amount greater than that provided by law. Another classic illustration
of "legal impossibility" is that a boy under fourteen years of age cannot
be guilty of an attempt to commit rape, because he is "conclusively pre-
sumed to be incapable of committing the crime of rape."' 27
Where, however, the courts have found not a "legal" but a "factual
impossibility," it is said to be a general "rule" that the defendant may
be guilty of a criminal attempt.28  It has been stated that "factual im-
possibility" exists when "the accomplishment of the crime may be ren-
dered impossible by reason of (1) the physical inability of the actor,
(2) some inactive prevention or (3) the intervention of some natural
force."' 29 A man who fails to rape a woman because of a physical im-
potency is said to be guilty of attempted rape.80 Inactive prevention
may be provided by the absence of a subject of larceny in a man's pocket,
though the person who attempts to pick the pocket will be guilty of
attempted larceny.3 ' Active prevention may be illustrated by the de-
fendant's attempt to rape a girl who runs away from him, in which case
the defendant has been found guilty of attempted rape.3 2
Some of the difficulties in "impossibility" are presented when one con-
siders the instant case of attempted perjury. Three writers have said
that a person could not be convicted of an attempted perjury (applying
the rule of "legal impossibility"), 3. However, Wharton states: "An
attempt to commit perjury is indictable on the same reasoning as are
attempts to commit other offenses. And when the complete offense of
perjury is not proved (as where the false oath is taken before an incom-
petent officer, the defendant believing him to be competent), the de-
fendant may be indicted for the attempt. '3 4 Yet, none of the cases cited
by Wharton recognized the crime of attempted perjury as such.3 5 Two
24 HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 117.
185 N . Y. 497, 78 N. E. 169 (1906).
2658 N. J. L. 207, 33 Atl. 208 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 311, 31 S. E. 503, 505 (1898).
2 HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 117.
29 Keedy, supra note 8, at 479.
Preddy v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 765, 36 S. E. 2d 549 (1946).
"State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500 (1862) ; People v. Jones, 46 Mich. 441 (1881).
"Lewis v. State, 35 Ala. 380 (1860).
"HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 92; 2 STPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMtINAr,
LAW OF ENGLAND 227 (London: MacMillan and Co., 1883) ; Strayhorn, supra note
22, at 995.
" 2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 7, § 1592.
", Regina v. Hodgkiss, 11 Cox C. C. 365 (1869) ; Regina v. Stone, 6 Cox C. C.
235, 169 Eng. Rep. 715 (1853) ; Regina v. Chapman, 175 Eng. Rep. 356 (1850) ;
Rex v. Taylor, 90 Eng. Rep. 1194 (1738). Each of these defendants was indicted
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cases somewhat in point seem to infer that the notion of "legal impossi-
bility" should preclude conviction.8 6
What seems to be involved in the examples cited by the court in State
v. Latiolais is the label "legal impossibility." Thus, if the general rule
of "legal impossibility" is followed, the defendant in such circumstances
should be acquitted. But should the determination of whether certain
acts constitute criminal attempts turn on the labeling of various circum-
stances as "legally impossible" or "factually impossible ?" That is what
the courts have done in many cases, but a reference to them will indicate
that this is not a wholly satisfactory procedure.
It is submitted that the rule of "legal impossibility" is of no relevance
to attempted perjury (or other criminal attempts). It must be remem-
bered that what is involved in all attempt cases is the absence of a
material element of the substantive crime ;37 and that that absence creates
the failure of consummation of the intended substantive crime. To label a
circumstance "legally impossible" is merely to designate a missing mate-
rial element of the substantive crime. In that respect, a "legally impos-
sible" circumstance merely possesses-what is common to all other attempt
situations, that is, a factual circumstance which prevents commission of
the substantive crime. Consider a classic case of "factual impossibility"-
the' thief who picks an empty pocket,38 with a classic case of "legal im-
possibility"-the thief who buys goods that he wrongly thinks are stolen
from the true owner.3 9 In the former the defendant was held guilty of
attempted larceny, and in the latter the defendant was held not guilty
of an attempt to receive stolen goods. In the pickpocket case, it was
for perjury. In Rex v. Taylor, the court merely discussed an evidentiary question.
In Regina v. Hodgkiss and Regina v. Chapman, no case for perjury could be made
out, so the courts found the defendants guilty of a misdemeanor, more for making
false affidavits under prohibition of statute than for attempting perjury. No men-
tion of attempt was made at all. The cases seemed to be simply statutory cases of
false swearing, for which the defendants had not been properly indicted. There is
some sign of attempted perjury in Regina v. Stone. There the defendant swore to
a false affidavit for use in the Admiralty Court, but the official did not have author-
ity to give the oath or take the affidavit for that purpose. The court held that the
defendant would not be guilty of perjury, but "would be guilty of a misdemeanor-
for he would thereby attempt to fraud the court." Regina v. Stone, 6 Cox C. C.
at 240. It is interesting to note that the English Reprint report, written in some-
what different language, does not contain the clause "for he would thereby attempt
to fraud the court."
" One held that the defendant could not be guilty of an attempt to obtain a school
warrant from a board of school officials, if the officials had no legal authority to
issue a valid warrant. State v. Lawrence, 178 Mo. 350, 77 S. W. 497 (1903). The
other held that the defendant could not be guilty, of an attempt to bribe an official
to vote for awarding a contract, when the official had no legal right or authority
to vote on the issue. State v. Butler, 178 Mo. 272, 77 S. W. 560 (1903).
"7 See HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 117-129.
" State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500 (1862) ; People v. Jones, 46 Mich. 441 (1881)
People v. Moran, 123 N. Y. 254, 25 N. E. 412 (1890) ; Regina v. Ring, 17 Cox C. C.
491, 66 L. T. 300 (1892) ; Regina v. Brown, 16 Cox C. C. 715, 61 L. T. 594 (1889).
: 185 N. Y. 497, 78 N. E. 169 (1906).
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impossible for the defendant to violate the law of larceny. And in the
stolen goods case, it was impossible for the defendant to violate the law
of criminal receiving. In one case, the fact that the pocket was empty,
and in the other, the fact that the goods had been surreptitiously returned
to the true owner's control prevented commission of the intended sub-
stantive crime. In both cases, the law was dealing with thieves who had
done all they could to achieve success in a manifestly anti-social enter-
prise. For penological purposes, both defendants were thieves, and both
had engaged in open thievery. In both cases, a factual circumstance was
the essential factor which prevented the commission of the substantive
crime.
The same argument holds true in other cases of "legal impossibility."
For example, the fact that a boy is under the statutory age precludes his
being held guilty of rape.40 But if he possesses the intent to ravish a
woman and does some act toward the accomplishment of that end, why
should he not be held guilty of an attempted rape? If it is believed that
he should not be so convicted, such a conclusion should be based on
reasoning other than that it was "legally impossible" for him to commit
the crime of rape.41  It would seem therefore that the rule of "legal
impossibility" is circumscribed by the rule of "factual impossibility."
Thus one writer has been led to the conclusion that "there is no such
thing as 'legal impossibility,' ",42 and that in criminal attempts only
"factual impossibility" is relevant.
43
The significance of "impossibility" circumstances has been sum-
marized by Professor Hall as follows: "(1) that unless the objective
sought is legally proscribed, the doing of it is not criminal nor is any
conduct falling short of it a criminal attempt ... ; and (2) if the end
sought is legally proscribed, the failure to attain it, because of the lack
of a factual condition necessary to its attainment, is no defense." 44 Thus,
it is what the defendant believes he is doing that is important. If what
the defendant intends is not a crime, no act falling short of it will be
criminal. But if the result which he thinks he can accomplish-his
expectations as he conceived them-is a crime, action which does not
result in commission of the crime may nevertheless be a criminal attempt.
Thus, since all "impossibility" is "factual," and since that should be
no defense, "impossibility" is not a criterion to be utilized in determining
whether a given overt act is a criminal attempt, but is merely a term
40 Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 311, 31 S. E. 503, 505 (1898).
4 1, [T]he simple holding that age is also a material fact in the criminal attempt
suffices." HALL, op. cit. supra note 14, at 127.
'2 1d. at 118.




descriptive of some types of circumstances which operate to prevent
commission of the substantive crime.
45
We are left, then, with the question of what criteria should be utilized
in determining when an overt act, failing to effect the commission of the
crime intended, becomes a criminal attempt.
It must be remembered that at very early common law attempts to
commit crimes were not punished, simply for the reason that they were
not regarded as harmfil.46 And it was not until the 17th and 18th cen-
turies that the English courts began recognizing certain attempts as
criminal.4 7  During that period, courts, apparently with no conscious
design, began to realize that certain attempts to commit crimes were
harmful to society and should be punished. However inarticulate their
motivations may have been, courts slowly recognized that certain at-
tempts constituted punishable behavior that was antithetical to the in-
terests of social welfare and detrimental to the existence of a well-
ordered society. This rationale of attempts led to the formulation of the
doctrine that an attempt to commit a crime is criminal.
Since the origin of this doctrine, the maze created by the voluminous
number of court decisions has tended to obscure the rationale and its
function. The rationale recognizes that certain attempts to commit
crimes ought to be punished. The function of the rationale is the deter-
mination of whether the defendant's ultimate objective as he conceived
it is legally proscribed, and, if it is, whether the steps taken toward its
consummation produce sufficient external harm to society to justify legal
cognizance and punishment. What is important is not how "dangerously
"',The most significant effort to deal with the problems of attempt and "impos-
sibility" is found in Wis. CRIm. CODE § 339.32 (1953) : "(2) An attempt to commit
a crime requires that the actor have an intent to commit that crime and that he
either :
(a) Does all the acts which he believes necessary to commit the crime; or
(b) Does acts which go far enough toward the commission of the crime to
demonstrate unequivocally, under all the circumstances, that a person having formed
that intent and having gone that far would normally commit the crime except for
the intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor. This para-
graph does not apply if the actor voluntarily changes his intent and decides not to
commit the crime.
(3) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that, because of a
mistake of fact or law other than criminal law, which does not negative the actor's
intent to commit the crime, it would have been impossible for him to commit the
crime attempted."
" "Apparently in those forthright days, a miss was as good as a mile." Id. at
64. Bracton quoted what was apparently a maxim of the day, "'For what harm did
the attempt cause, since the injury took no effect?"' 2 BRAcrON, DE LEGIBUS Er
CONSUrTDIus ANGLIAE 337, f. 128, 13 (Twiss ed.; London: Longman and Co.,
1878).
"Authorities are in disagreement as to whether the doctrine of criminal attempts
was born in the Court of the Star Chamber. Compare HALL, op. cit. supra note
14, at 72-81 with 2 STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 223. Stephen is of the
opinion that the doctrine originated in that court. But Professor Hall believes that
it did not receive expression until 1801. HALT- at 87. On the history of criminal
attempts, see HAL at 61-88.
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close" the act comes within completion of the substantive crime, or how
"impossible" it is to commit the crime, but rather whether the external
harm created by the overt act is of such magnitude that it can be recog-
nized and identified as an act which ought to be punished.
The determination of the criminality of overt acts must be left to the
courts, for the law of criminal attempts presupposes that statutory crimi-
nal prohibitions cannot be all-inclusive of human conduct that should be
punishable. The law of criminal attempts therefore gives the courts a
power 4 3 to extend the rationale of prohibited substantive crimes to in-
clude conduct which, though not within the definition of a substantive
crime, ought not to go unpunished.
49
Criteria that may be applied in determining whether certain acts
constitute criminal attempts are: (1) what is the rationale of the pro-
hibited substantive crime;5° (2) what is the nature of the defendant's
intent and overt act;,1 (3) what is the extent of the external harm to
society created by the defendant's act ;52 and (4) do the rationale of the
substantive crime and the extent of the external harm justify legal cog-
nizance and punishment of the defendant's act ?53
These criteria can be applied to the instance case. The commission
of the crime of perjury is a flagrant exhibition of contempt for the or-
ganized proceedings of government, which if left unpunished would
eventually lead to a chaotic state of government. The rationale of its
statutory prohibition recognizes: (1) the essentiality of soliciting truthful
testimony from citizens for effective performance of various govern-
mental functions; and (2) for the purpose of minimizing obstructions
to the accomplishment of that end, the essentiality of preserving the
solemnity of the oath and the dignity of the courts, tribunals and other
agencies of government. The defendant in State v. Latiolais intended to
commit perjury before. an apparently legally authorized governmental
48 See Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE
L. J. 53, 75-80 (1930).
" Thus, in dealing with a given overt act, it is necessary to understand the
rationale of the substantive crime attempted, in addition to the rationale of attempts.
"' Determination of the rationale of the prohibited substantive crime involves a
consideration of what human action is proscribed by the prohibition, a consideration
of the policy underlying the particular prohibition (i.e., why such action is deemed
punishable), and a consideration of theories of punishment underlying the entire
field of criminal law and their relation to the policy of the particular prohibition.
This determination lays the foundation for the consideration of whether the de-
fendant's acts should be punished.
" This criterion merely involves the determination of the physical aspects of the
defendant's actions.
2 Determination of external harm will depend upon the nature of the defendant's
action, the nature (i.e., the physical aspects) and the rationale of the prohibited
substantive crime, and the functions of the mental element and the overt act. See
notes 16 and 17 supra for a discussion of the meaning of external harm and some of
the problems involved in recognizing external harm.
" This determination will of course depend primarily upon the attitude and ap-
proach of each court or jurisdiction.
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agency, and made. a false statement under oath before that agency. His
effort was frustrated only by the fact that for some reason the agency
was either unauthorized to receive his testimony or by the fact that the
official administering the oath was unauthorized to administer it. The
defendant's acts, though not constituting perjury, nevertheless seem to
be within the scope of the rationale of the substantive crime.
To permit such actions to go unpunished because of "legal impossi-
bility" would not only condone planned and deliberate contempt of legal
proceedings, but would make criminality turn on rules which have no
functional relevance to the determination of whether the defendant's be-
havior should be punished. It would seem under such circumstances
that a court should be justified in punishing the defendant's actions as a
criminal attempt.
J. THOMAS MANN.
Dead Bodies-Autopsies--Authority to Use Parts Removed in
Treatment of the Living
Medical science has made great progress in the use of tissue, bone,
and other matter removed from deceased persons in the treatment of
living patients,1 but in North Carolina the sources of supply of such
matter are limited because of areas of uncertainty in the law with regard
to property and disposition rights in dead bodies.
2
North Carolina seems to be in accord with the general rule that a
dead body is not property, in the ordinary sense.3 However, a right of
testamentary disposition is recognized by the court,4 and provided for
by statute.5 In the absence of such disposition, there is a right to pos-
1 "It is becoming increasingly easy to use organs and tissues from deceased per-
sons (cadavers) in treating and sometimes curing, otherwise fatal diseases in living
patients. There is a good possibility that within 10 years it will be possible to
transplant complex organs from a cadaver to a living person." Letter from John
B. Graham, M.D., Department of Pathology, University of North Carolina School
of Medicine, to Richard A. Myren, Assistant Director, Institute of Government.
University of North Carolina, March 7, 1955. The Raleigh Times, March 28, 1955,
p. 9, col. 6, reported the successful transplantation of four ribs, a collarbone, and a
breastbone from the body of a deceased person to that of a living person. Colliers,
April 25, 1953, pp. 74-77.
. Although medical schools obtain cadavers for use in the study of anatomy under
the authority of N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-211, et seq. (1950), these sections do not
authorize the use of parts of such bodies in the treatment of patients.
' Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Welch, 82 F. 2d 799 (5th Cir. 1936) ; Gray v.
Southern Pacific Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 240, 68 P. 2d 1011 (1937) ; Pierce v. Pro-
prietors, 10 R. I. 227 (1872) ; Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N. W. 40 (1905).
Accord, Kyles v. Southern Ry. Co., 147 N. C. 394, 61 S. E. 278 (1908). But see
Bonaparte v. Fraternal Funeral Home, 206 N. C. 652, 175 S. E. 137 (1934).
'Kyles v. Southern Ry. Co., supra note 3. 25 C. J. S., Dead Bodies § 9 (1941).
r"... nothing in §§ 90-211 through 90-216, inclusive, shall prevent a person
from making testamentary disposition of his or her body after death." N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-213 (1950). N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-216.1, et seq. (Supp. 1953) provides
for the testamentary donation of one's body to certain institutions for the rehabili-
tation of the maimed.
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